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Political violence includes an array of conducts and events that defy unilateral 
examination. It may be authorized or unauthorized violence, and while the latter 
is almost always associated with crime, the former is normally deemed an 
expression of the legitimate monopoly in the use of force characterizing modern 
societies. There are institutional and anti-institutional forms of political violence, 
namely violence of the authority and violent expressions of defiance against 
authority. Both have been the object of analysis by sociologists and 
criminologists, with some contending that theories of ‘common’ violence should 
be applied to the analysis of political violence. It is assumed, for example, that 
both types of violence possess a goal-directed character: achieving results, 
extracting something of value from others, or exercising justice by punishing 
wrongdoers. Other analysts, however, link political violence with social conflict 
derived from collective grievance around inequality and injustice, thus locating 
this type of violence within the tradition of social movement analysis and the 
dynamics of collective action. Conflict theory provides a prime framework for 
this type of analysis, which focuses on contentious issues, organizational matters 
and the shaping of identities that lead aggrieved groups to turn to violence. 
Sociological and criminological theories also offer a rich analytical patrimony 
that helps focusing on political crime committed by states and their 
representatives occupying powerful social positions. Many contributions, in this 
respect, cover atrocities perpetrated by institutional actors and the different 
forms of conscious, unconscious, personal, cultural, or official, denial 
accompanying such atrocities. The term political crime, therefore, ends up 
relating to state crime, political and administrative corruption, and a variety of 
crimes of the elite normally included under the umbrella definition ‘the crimes of 
the powerful’. Conversely, when the focus moves onto political violence 
perpetrated by anti-institutional or non-state actors, the term ‘terrorism’ is 
usually referred to, a term that is not likely to meet universal acceptance or 
unquestioned adoption due to the difficulties social scientists find in defining it. 
In sum, political violence and crime present scholars and practitioners with the 
same ambiguity that connotes definitions of social behavior and the processes of 
its criminalization. Such ambiguity becomes clear if, as proposed in the following 
pages, political violence and crime are examined through multidisciplinary 
lenses, particularly those offered by social theory, philosophy and criminology.   
 
Keywords: political violence, social conflict, state crime, criminalization, 
terrorism, radicalization, social movements. 
 
Protest and Hostility 
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In some situations, the possibility of expressing protest by means other than 
hostility may be very limited. Peaceful means may not be available, and 
politicized individuals and groups may feel that they will be permanently 
unavailable. It is true that aggrieved people are always likely to be driven into 
hostile outbursts, but under certain circumstances it is the institutions 
themselves that ‘invite’ people to display hostility (Smelser, 1963). Political 
violence, from this perspective, is the result of the gradual or sudden closing of 
legitimate channels of protest. Some situations, therefore, are conducive to 
collective violence, as they are characterized by precipitating factors which turn 
dissatisfaction, strain and protest into radical antagonism and violent action. 
This may happen in contexts as diverse as prison settings and factories, where 
attempts to achieve goals peacefully are repeatedly frustrated. Moreover, one 
hostile outburst can often act as a precipitating factor for further outbursts, 
spreading violent practices across aggrieved social groups. 
   What is important to note in this analysis is the role played by institutional 
agencies in the development of political violence from below. The level of 
institutional violence in the form of repression, and the manner in which it is 
deployed, affect the degree of hostility. For example, looking at processes of 
social change generated by industrialization or by deindustrialization, we can 
observe that both may cause stress, discontent and disorder. However, there is 
no automatic association between such processes and the radicalization of social 
conflict. Industrialization and deindustrialization only provide the background 
for possible disorder, and it is the interactions between groups and between 
these and the authorities that produce radicalism, rebelliousness, and violent 
protest (Blumer, 1990). According to this interactionist approach, for instance, 
state reaction leads to imputations of violence against forms of protest which are 
not intentionally violent. Think of peaceful demonstrations where participants 
are either falsely charged and arrested or forced to resort to some improvised 
form of self-defense. In such cases, participants charged with violent offences 
would normally claim their innocence and return the imputation to law 
enforcers, denouncing their abusive and brutal practices. Imputations of 
unlawfulness, in these cases, are mutually exchanged between the parties, with 
both referring to a common understanding of what lawful conduct should be. 
When authorities reaffirm the moral meaning of everyday life (Douglas, 1970), 
they also reaffirm their power to construct violent labels and apply them ad hoc 
when necessary. In doing so they use, or abuse, an optimum degree of force, 
whether physical or ideological. 
   Following this analytical path, we may reach the conclusion that political 
violence is caused or is mainly to be equated to institutional violence, thus 
excluding that rational agents might choose violence as an expression of political 
dissent. In reality, the choice of engaging in anti-institutional political violence 
may trigger a process that can be described in the following ideal-typical fashion.  
    The interaction between aggrieved groups and law enforcers can produce a 
split between those who see peaceful protest as an integral part of their rights 
and those who assume that protest is quintessentially violent. Radicalization of 
protest, then, may produce harsher state repression and unleash a vicious circle 
of violence-repression-violence-repression (Della Porta, 1995). Minority protest 
groups begin to perceive, at this stage, that the use of violent means becomes 
necessary, as these constitute a mere extension of the social conflicts in which 
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large groups also engage. Some may opt for armed struggle, a phrase that hints at 
a rupture point in a continuum where the existing social conflict is boosted and 
brought to a superior level. Targets are immediately recognizable symbols, as 
they are related to specific arenas in which protesters engage. 
   An escalating process may then lead to a different stage. While concrete 
achievements are relentlessly dismantled and political space narrowed, violent 
protest groups may take a relatively independent trajectory. Their action, for 
instance, can be channeled into the pursuit of a limited range of objectives whose 
achievement, under normal circumstances, would not require the use of high 
degrees of violence. In other words, perfectly legitimate goals slowly come to be 
pursued through illegitimate means. Armed struggle, thus, turns into armed 
trade unionism, while the growth of the armed group, recruitment among 
activists, and the accumulation of firepower start losing connections with the 
social issues originally addressed. In a subsequent phase, anti-institutional 
political violence may evolve into armed propaganda, as groups become 
completely disconnected from the social objectives allegedly inspiring them and 
devote most of their energies to the accumulation of military strength. Violent 
acts, at this stage, simply allude to the possibility that the monopoly of the state 
in the use of force can be challenged and that breaking away from legally 
accepted forms of contention is necessary. At this stage military episodes, in 
most cases, are no longer decodable as manifestations of wider social conflicts, 
but as products of a military group seeking self-promotion. Social dynamics, as 
points of reference for political action, slowly become redundant, while the 
armed organization pursues its own reproduction in terms of membership and 
infrastructures. Targets are no longer chosen on the basis of their significance in 
relation to social issues, but for their capacity to illustrate the military power of 
the organization (Ruggiero, 2005a). Political violence, here, aims at 
strengthening resolve and group cohesion, at conveying an image of 
determination and potency, and involves an element of spectacular propaganda 
making it attractive to potential recruits and menacing to chosen enemies. 
   Finally, when the accumulation of military force, though significant, appears to 
be insufficient to match that possessed by the institutions, armed propaganda 
becomes unrealistic. Political activists and social groups in general cannot be 
offered competitive structures and practices leading to a different social order. 
Defeat is most likely and social and political gains are replaced with gains in 
other, less palpable, spheres. The choice of targets can no longer be justified by 
the specific social goal pursued, but is given a transcendental justification that 
Camus (1965) terms historical. According to Camus, there are some political 
conflicts emphasizing history, and others emphasizing humanity. The emphasis 
on history destroys all limits to human action, because history itself becomes the 
supreme judge of the morality of the action. Violent groups inspired by a sense of 
historical inevitability appropriate the ‘right to punish’ from their enemy and, 
after dressing it with a religious mantle, put punishment at the centre of the 
universe. The sense of historical inevitability makes violence randomized, 
limitless: history will vindicate the legitimacy of that violence (Ruggiero, 2006). 
 
Criminology, political violence and war 
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Criminological thinking has engaged with contemporary forms of terrorism, 
testing hypotheses and theories that only recently have been applied to this area 
of research. Traditionally the domain of political science and international 
relations, political violence has been studied through the lenses of rational 
choice theory, while institutional responses to terrorism have been analyzed 
within the framework of situational crime prevention. Studies have attempted to 
ascertain whether target hardening and harsher legislation can deter and 
incapacitate or, on the contrary, are likely to enhance terrorism (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006; Fahey et al, 2012).  
   A special issue of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence published in 2015 
contains a series of articles testing the validity of criminological theories in the 
analysis of terrorism (Freilich and LaFree, 2015). Jihadi and far-right groups are 
studied from strain and subcultural perspectives, and support is found for the 
status frustration hypothesis. The socio-demographic characteristics of jihadi, 
far-right and far-left extremists are compared using data from the US Extremist 
Crime Database, suggesting that violence as a result of marginalization may 
characterize the first two, who experience little success in the legitimate world. 
Instead, far-left extremists, who often do possess the means to achieve the 
official goals of the American society (in Merton’s terms, money and success), are 
found to reject such goals and pursue alternative values through the ‘deviant 
adaptation’ termed by Merton ‘rebellion’.   
   It may sound paradoxical to examine terrorism, normally sustained by 
structured and efficient organizations, through social disorganization theory, 
unless disorganization is understood as a condition of instability and anomie. 
Looking at terrorist attacks in about one hundred countries from 1981 to 2010, a 
positive correlation is found between acts of terror and political instability. The 
special issue of the journal mentioned above also includes research findings 
relating to victims of terrorism, how their routine activities and lifestyles 
influence victimization, and how deterrence and situational prevention might 
work. Learning theories are tested and theories of radicalization formulated, 
indicating that individuals and groups experience feelings of humiliation and 
grief due to their identification with populations hurt by dominant countries or, 
in general, national governments. Surely, the limitations of such studies are to be 
ascribed partly to the sources utilized, usually official data that may or may not 
record violent acts as acts of terrorism. Moreover, the possibility of conducting 
victimization survey or collecting self-report data, successfully practiced in other 
criminological research, seems unfeasible in this area. However, the most 
worrying limitation of available studies is the absence in them of any concern 
around violence exercised by states.  
   This particular form of political violence provides large material for 
criminological enquiry, particularly in the research area pertaining to the crimes 
of the powerful.  
   A set of conceptualizations of the crimes of the powerful arises from the 
analysis of the state. Particularly focused on violence, these conceptualizations 
see the crimes of the powerful as original foundational events, as secular forms 
of Promethean acts leading to state formation. These acts, it is argued, constitute 
authorized force and amount to law-making violence. They can be foundational, 
when they establish new systems and designate a new authority. But they may 
also amount to law-conserving violence, when they protect the stability of 
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systems and reinforce authority (Derrida, 1992; Benjamin, 1996). Tilly’s (1985) 
work is, in this respect, well known for its emphasis on the centrality of direct 
organized force to the process of state-making (Whyte, 2009). The crimes of the 
powerful, from this perspective, give us a picture of how power is formed and 
distributed within society and how such distribution can be altered (Geis and 
Meier, 1977). Pursuing this strand of analysis some scholars have looked at 
extra-legal activities of the modern state and how these can be located within 
legal-political theory (Sabuktay, 2009), while other experts of state crime in 
general have remarked that the core capitalist states remain the greatest source 
of state-supported harm, violence and injury (Rothe and Ross, 2009; Chambliss, 
Michalowski and Kramer, 2010). 
    War, as an extreme form of political violence, has also mobilized analytical 
efforts by criminologists, not least for the disproportionate character and 
magnifying effect that it confers on human conflict, social interaction and state 
responses. Action by state agents, despite attempts to publicly sanitize its 
manifestations, aims at one, central obsessive task, namely killing. This task is 
one with its opposite, that is surviving, which signifies triumph over death while 
inflicting it to others: hence, conduct loses all sense of proportion. Criminologists 
have studied the relationship between war and crime, focusing on mass 
victimization and violations of human rights. ‘Crime in war and ‘war crimes’ have 
become central areas of investigation, and while the former are exemplified by 
conventional predatory offences, interpersonal violence and illicit market 
operations, the latter can be included under the rubric of state political violence 
(Hagan, 2003). Social disorganization can be invoked to explain the dramatic, 
pervasive increase in criminal activities in situations of war, when it is hard to 
distinguish between regular armies, paramilitaries, mercenaries and violent 
gangs. While scarcity may account for the growth of grey or hidden economies, 
the inflationary effect of violence, in war situations in general, may be mobilized 
to account for an increase in interpersonal violence. Once made legitimate, 
violence comes to be viewed as the only effective tool for the protection of one’s 
wellbeing, the achievement of one’s goals, or the solution of personal differences. 
Based on learning theories of crime, such explanations posit the magnifying 
effect of institutional violence upon social interactions, leading to the 
devaluation of human life. As for war crimes, techniques of neutralization can be 
invoked as explanatory devices whereby atrocities committed are 
psychologically removed. The celebrated analysis of Sykes and Matza (1957) is 
applied to torture and other war excesses. Denying responsibility for the injury 
caused, denying that an injury has been caused at all, denying the human worth 
of the victim, or appealing to higher loyalties, all constitute recognizable devices 
to evade moral and criminal judgment (Cohen, 2001). On the other hand, it may 
also been argued that states and their agents need not mobilize neutralizations 
or justifications because the violence they deploy is not only legitimate, but also 
associated with supreme values such as patriotism and national identity. 
Techniques are neutralization, on the contrary, are required when individuals 
refuse to participate in wars, namely when they find alternative sets of values 
and conducts which justify their objections to following orders. War is an 
extreme expression of conventionality, and soldiers do not have to excuse 
themselves for anything, unless they refuse to kill. 
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    In brief, the criminology of war deals with war crimes but also with ‘war as 
crime’, on how international conflicts are becoming forms of corporate plunder, 
on torture, illegal invasions by states, and the use of prohibited weapons. 
Provocative calls for the outright criminalization of war, echoing Kant’s plea for 
perpetual peace, are also found in this literature (Ruggiero, 2005b; Jamieson, 
2014; Walklate and McGarry, 2015; McGarry and Walklate, 2016).  
    The case study below may be significant in that it draws light on both state and 
non-state political violence. 
 
Case Study: Contemporary International Terrorism 
 
Currently, political-religious groups raise major concerns. Most of these groups 
engage in ‘pure’ political violence, namely random mass violence on civilians 
(Black, 2004). We find an echo, here, of the historical transcendental justification 
formulated by Camus. Organizations using ‘pure’ political violence adopt a 
concept of collective liability applied to the groups against which they fight. 
Targets are not precise actors whose conduct is deemed wrongful, but general 
populations defined by nationality, ethnicity, religious or political creed. Victims 
are not individuals, but individuals belonging to real or imagined alien groups. 
   Recent events have led attention away from the search for general causations 
of anti-institutional political violence and shifted the focus specifically onto 
radicalized Islamic groups. One of the causes identified is the feeling of 
‘weakness, irrelevance, marginalization and subordination experienced by 
Muslim people’, combined with the memory of a glorious past of a great 
transnational civilization (Toscano, 2016: 123). The ‘reactionary utopia’ of the 
Caliphate is explained in these terms, namely as the result of frustration 
determined by the gap between expectations and achievement. The frustration 
thesis seems to apply to both prevailing models of terrorism: ‘the fanatic who is 
outside any appeal to rationality, and the calculating actor who lacks any 
capacity for human empathy’ (McDonald, 2013: 11). Advocates of the ‘new 
terrorism’ model emphasize its pathological aspects, arguing that participants 
suffer from personality disorder and mental unbalance. On the other hand, terror 
is also associated with the search for redemption, with protagonists neither 
‘fanatic’ nor ‘calculating’, but just enacting redemptive violence that transforms 
and ‘saves’ at the same time (Weisbrod, 2002).  
   We may attempt to find in sacred texts the cause of contemporary terrorism. 
For example, charting the history of the Islamic State since its first incarnation in 
the seventh century, the following Hadith (a prophesy emanating from the 
Prophet Muhammad) can be highlighted. Widely accepted among Sunni 
Islamists, the prophecy states that the history of the umma (the Muslim 
international community) will go through five phases: first, the Prophet himself 
will rule; then Caliphs will rule according to the Prophet’s teachings; then force 
will be necessary for those teachings to spread; later, coercive rules will be 
established; finally, the time of Caliphate will return and usher in the end of the 
world (Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016). The current phase, we are warned, 
witnesses the final contest between the forces of faith and the forces of atheism 
(Fishman, 2016).  
   Against causations derived from religious texts, the contention can be made 
that the Quran is replete with suggestions around dialogue, peace and the 
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development of harmonious interfaith relationships. There are many passages in 
the Quran that destroy the idea, propagated by some, that non-Muslims are 
infidels and must be eliminated (Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Ultimately, it can be 
argued that not Islam, but religion in general has always played a role in war and 
terrorist violence, even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Sacks, 2015; 
Hassner, 2016). 
   Non-state violent organizations must, by definition, adopt clandestine 
structures, although the model with which they present themselves may vary 
according to contexts and to repressive institutional action (Beck, 2015). In 
situations where popular support is widespread, terrorist groups may set up 
dual structures composed of an official, legitimate layer of activists and a hidden 
nucleus of combatants waging armed attacks. This dual structure seems to 
survive as far as terrorist organizations maintain strong links with social 
movements and perceive themselves as representatives of aggrieved groups 
(Combs, 2013; Martin, 2010). The shift postulated above, that from initial armed 
struggle culminates into ‘historical’ violence, should be borne in mind. Lack of 
support from social groups, who express their contentious politics through 
visible social movement activity, often determines the collapse of terrorist 
groups, as shown in the cases of the Red Brigades, the Red Army Fraction, ETA 
and the IRA (Ruggiero, 2010).  
   Contemporary terrorist groups have evolved over the last two decades as a 
result of international events and along with the intensification of institutional 
responses. In the 1990s, for instance, hard-core militants prevailed in 
organizations that displayed a high degree of professionalism and role 
differentiation. The distance between leaders and adherents was kept to a 
minimum, and all participants were tasked with specific operations that they 
were well able to carry out due to expertise and appropriate skills. Recruitment 
was selective and based, among other things, on proven ideological loyalty, 
military expertise, possession of resources, range of reliable followers, status and 
available key contacts. The prevailing model was, therefore, one that echoed the 
old international political organizations, with a central committee dictating the 
‘line’, establishing the goals, identifying possible allies and drawing a short-term 
as well as a long-term strategy. The latter, of course, was the attainment of 
power, pursued through the building of strong links among leaders, participants, 
supporting social groups, and their allies. 
   This structure, which concentrated members operating according to the 
principles of ‘authoritarian centralism’, was eroded as a result of the generalized 
‘war on terror’. Slowly, it was supplemented with more or less coordinated 
cellular units associated to the core organization through increasingly weaker 
links. Attacks by scattered cells started to follow a ‘logic’ rather than an 
established ‘programme’, with copycat action being carried out in diverse and 
distant contexts. Communication among terrorist cells, in brief, began to revolve 
around the symbolic nature of the destructive act, a form of signature indicating 
a common identity. Such terrorist cells, which are still operating now, are devoid 
of an international reach, but become international thanks to the images they 
furnish, the imagination they stimulate and the repetitions they encourage. 
‘Violence increasingly seeks excess and rupture rather than organization and 
programme’ (McDonald, 2013: 168).  
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    In the current phase, the development of ‘networks of cells’ seems to 
constitute the prevailing trend. The core structure, of course, remains and is now 
located in specific territories acquired through military force, while peripheral 
entities are scattered and offer their support in a variety of fashions. Isis is said 
to adopt Mao’s revolutionary warfare strategy, based on the formation of an 
irregular army. But while for Mao this army relied mainly on peasants, for Isis it 
avails itself of the expertise of jihadists from previous conflicts mixed with 
professional soldiers and intelligence personnel (Whiteside, 2016). Isis has 
conducted dozens of prison breaks, freeing thousands of veterans, while some 
20,000 inmates were released between 2008-2010 in rudderless countries 
afflicted by civil war. This constitutes, perhaps, a major pool of potential recruits, 
an army born of chaos held by those in command through a vertical apparatus 
and functional bureaus. This organizational form is copied largely from al Qaeda, 
is financially self-sufficient, media savvy, and kept together by a strong 
leadership.  
   At the same time, small groups of individuals may just plan and execute attacks 
which seem to be consistent with the strategy of the core organization, with or 
without its prior assent or post-facto endorsement. Recruitment may spread and 
attract also young women who are prepared to become spouses of combatants in 
the regions where the organization rules. New combatants are also recruited 
from the large repository of aggrieved Muslims resident in most western 
countries.  In brief, it no longer seems that terrorism can be imputed to a single, 
however loosely, organized group. Along with hierarchical organizations, there 
are bands of followers who act outside formal structures and ‘are motivated by 
feelings and beliefs widely shared among millions of Muslims worldwide…. The 
independence of the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai 
(2008) from Al Qaeda control or direction is a vivid demonstration’ (Blum and 
Heymann, 2010: 162). Among the people imprisoned in the UK between 2001 
and 2009 for planning or attempting to undertake terrorist-related violence, the 
majority had no identifiable links with terrorist-related organizations (Simcox et 
al, 2010). 
    Research on how foreign fighters access the battlefield shows that social 
networks are of paramount importance for joining groups involved in violence 
(Holman, 2016). It should be borne in mind that individuals eager to join 
terrorist networks pose serious security risks to insurgent entities. Hence the 
necessity to filter the recruitment process through mediators or facilitators. 
These make the process more opaque to law enforcement but, at the same time, 
guarantee a selection of sort of the would-be recruits. Those who are recruited, 
however, may not always be total novices or amateurs, as their identity and 
political inclination may already be well known to law enforcers. Think of  ‘Jihadi 
John’, a young Briton of Kuwaiti descent who grew up in London, a refugee 
whose family were granted asylum in the UK. A not untypical London youth, 
interested in drinking and pop music, he turned into a ‘psychopathic sadist and 
sickening killer’ (Anthony, 2016: 34). He became the focus of the secret services 
because of the extensive jihadi company he kept and, after being put under 
surveillance for some time, he developed a profound grievance towards the 
British state (Verkalk, 2016). 
    Recruitment, in the spreading ‘network of cells’, may therefore take place in 
the guise of self-affiliation, with individuals or small groups mimicking the acts 
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that they presume are consistent with the strategy and practice of the 
organization they would wish to join. The terrorist organization, in this way, can 
rely both on its own operative members and on a range of sympathizers 
scattered around the word. The latter, even when devoid of any practical 
connection with the ‘mother’ organization, in effect carry out its policy. Isis, for 
instance, owes its strength not only to its specific military power, but also to the 
exemplary nature of its acts that may be replicated by ‘lone wolves’, who feel 
legitimized to kill after internalizing the deadly philosophy of the organization 
(Keatinge and Keen, 2917). An example is the gunman who, in June 2016, killed 
fifty people and wounded fifty-three more after storming into a gay night club in 
Orlando, Florida. Omar Mateen was twenty-nine years old and a US citizen of 
Afghan heritage: he opened fire on partygoers with an AR-15 assault-rifle and 
handgun. Mateen had never been under surveillance and during the attack he 
was heard claiming allegiance to Isis (The Guardian, 13 June 2016). Here, hate 
crime and terrorism combine in the most explosive fashion, suggesting that 
structures and networks host individuals of varied ideological persuasion and 
personal motivation.  
   The trajectory leading to more open networks appears to be confirmed by the 
declining complexity of terror attacks recorded between 2004 and 2016 (Von 
Dongen, 2016). Such networks extend to prison institutions, which provide 
fertile ground for recruitment and opportunities for radicalization (Hamm, 
2013). Moreover, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there is growing recognition 
of the value of women’s active contribution to the movement. In the past, on the 
contrary, women would at times be encouraged by their own family to join 
suicide missions only as a form of ‘honor’ suicide, or because unmarried.  Calls 
have intensified for a new Palestinian woman – one who is not only the mother, 
sister or daughter of the martyr, but a martyr herself (Hasso, 2005; Oliver, 2007; 
Narozhna and Knight, 2016).  
   Little agency is accorded to individuals who join terrorist organizations, as they 
are often described as victims of ‘grooming’ or brain-washing. A study conducted 
by NATO (2016), for instance, examines hundreds of publications and narratives 
released by Isis addressed to sympathizers, supporters and potential soldiers. 
Religious narratives circulated on line attempt to turn people toward ‘Caliphate’ 
ideology, as do speeches by influential leaders and interviews with would-be 
suicide bombers. The organization does not limit the pool of its propaganda 
targets to potential combatants, but aims at a range of individuals who may 
provide financial support, medical assistance or help for jihadists and their 
families. Isis does not directly ask supporters to be ready to participate in 
missions or engage on the battlefield. However, it makes ‘a point of showcasing 
those who have already decided to fight the enemy and sacrifice their lives in the 
name of God’ (ibid: 13). It should be added that the most powerful propaganda 
weapon attracting combatants consists of the spectacle of destruction deployed 
by state responses and the desire for revenge it triggers. Interviews with those 
charged of cooperating with terrorist organizations reveal that  
 
‘People are motivated by taking revenge on those perceived as invaders of 
Iraq. Their testimonies show that in some cases, people didn’t need to be 
contacted by recruiters to join the organization. They were self-motivated 
to defend their country against invaders… None of the people interviewed 
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said that their socio-economic situation played a significant role in 
motivating them to become foreign terrorist fighters’ (ibid: 46-48). 
 
   Knowledge about the structure of terrorist networks remains limited, despite 
the fact that, since September 2001, interest in terrorist research has increased. 
Many studies are unempirical or anecdotal and some rely upon no evidence at 
all. While a new book on terrorism is published every six hours (Silke, 2008), the 
approach of academic publications remains exploratory and documentary. Over 
the last years, however, research has engaged with measurement issues (LaFree 
and Ackerman, 2009). The number of statistical studies has increased and large 
databases have been made available (see ‘further readings’ below).  
   To understand the relationship between institutional and anti-institutional 
political violence or, to put it differently, between terror and the war on terror, 





Ninety-three per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in 
countries with high levels of state sponsored terror – extra-judicial deaths, 
torture and imprisonment without trial. Over ninety per cent of all terrorism 
deaths occurred in countries engaged in violent conflicts and in OECD member 
nations with poorer performance in the sphere of respect for human rights 
(START, 2016). Meanwhile, torture has become an accepted practice in the fight 
against terror (Cohn, 2017).  
    The idea of democracy is being championed across the world, with some fifty 
new countries embracing this type of political system between 1974 and 2011 
(Freedom House, 2016). Simultaneously, however, dissatisfaction has grown due 
to the perceived incapacity of democracy to deal with collective problems. 
Among the traits that distinguish democratic systems is their capacity to respond 
to challenges or, in other words, their ability to deal with contentious politics. 
Democracies, in brief, can be classified on the basis of the elasticity of their 
structures and the degree to which they encourage political processes and social 
dynamism leading to change (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). 
    This classification was proposed by some among the very founders of classical 
political thought, with Machiavelli (1970), for instance, identifying as corrupt 
those systems which proved unable to deal with tumults and other forms of 
troubling dissent. Contention, including violent contention, Machiavelli argued, 
causes no harm, particularly when the elite, through changes in social 
arrangements and legislation, defeats the corrupt elements within itself. Livy’s 
history suggests that the absence of corruption was the reason why the 
numerous tumults that took place in Rome ‘did no harm, but, on the contrary, 
were an advantage to that republic’ (Bull, 2016: 35).  
    Democracies can claim that they are concerned with the pursuit of harmony 
and public wellbeing, but as Dewey (1954) argued, they can hardly claim that 
their acts are always socially beneficial. For instance, one the most regular 
activities of democracies is waging war. 
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‘Even the most bellicose of militarists will hardly contend that all wars 
have been socially helpful, or deny that some have been so destructive of 
social values that it would have been infinitely better if they had not been 
waged’ (ibid: 14). 
 
Democratic political acts, therefore, may be presented as socially beneficial, even 
when their anti-social nature prevails.  This is why citizens, Dewey warned, 
should be cautious in identifying their community and its interests with 
politically organized institutions and theirs.  
   ‘Anxious Dictators and Wavering Democracies’ was the title of a recent report 
published by Freedom House (2016). In the report, the US and Europe were 
described as struggling to cope with international events, particularly 
unresolved regional conflicts. Their role in exacerbating such conflicts was not 
explicitly mentioned, although both their action and inaction were said to have  
‘generated unprecedented numbers of refugees and incubated terrorist groups 
that inspired or organized attacks on targets aboard’ (ibid: 1). ‘Wavering 
democracies’ were accused of responding to such issues through the 
development of populist campaigns and the adoption of security measures that 
run counter the core values of free societies. Displaying lack of self-confidence, 
democracies were said to fuel xenophobic feelings, creating a climate in which 
attacks of facilities hosting refugees, the erection of fences and the creation of 
draconian laws become legitimized.  
 
‘In effect, the European establishment’s inability to manage these new 
challenges – on top of the lingering economic woes that began nearly a 
decade ago – gave fresh impetus to those who have questioned the 
European project and the liberal, universal values that it represents’ (ibid: 
2). 
 
   Intolerant policies were implemented in the name of patriotism and the 
draconian measures adopted against the ‘intruders’ were echoed by violent 
strategies of law enforcement and crowd control against all dissenters.  
    Recent invasions, illegal wars, torture, kidnappings, the use of prohibited 
weapons and the killing of civilians have been perpetrated in the name of 
freedom. Similarly, the mercenary-state partnerships and their destructive 
activities have been justified through the benefit they are bound to produce for 
the establishment of global liberty. With drones and homicide missions, 
democracies can assassinate people on the secret orders of heads of state, and 
‘for a highly targeted death (say, a gang chief) there are on average nine 
collateral victims’ (Badiou, 2016: 60). More than collateral damage, these 
assassinations amount to deterrence addressed to entire populations. 
    The failure of democracies signals a crisis of hegemony, whereby rules are 
suspended or eliminated, and open ‘wars of manoeuvre’ are waged against 
internal and external enemies (Jessop, 2016). The process triggers the creation 
of ‘deep states’, namely hidden auxiliary power networks impervious to popular 
scrutiny. Democracy, in this way, arms itself with the very forces that threaten it 
(Todorov, 2014). Openness, moderation and temperance are replaced by excess, 
hubris and feelings of omnipotence, while freedom and free enterprise 
intertwine with military missions which, rather than engaging in the arduous 
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task of establishing states, simply destroy states (Badiou, 2016). The enjoyment 
of rights is polarized, setting freedom of enterprise against freedom to remedy 
entrepreneurial social harm, freedom to establish political agendas against 
freedom to oppose them, freedom to engage in war against freedom to 
demonstrate against it.  
   The failure of democracy takes on the nature of an auto-immune disorder that 
threatens the life of contemporary societies and the legal systems that 
underwrite them. The war on terror is, therefore, akin to slow suicide, as 
societies attempting to protect themselves, in fact, destroy the defensive 
mechanisms that are supposed to guarantee their survival. ‘Repression – 
whether it be through the police, the military, or the economy – ends up 
producing and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm’ (Derrida, 2003: 
99). Failed democracies, in brief, contribute to the radicalization of dissent and 
the spreading of extremism. 
   Purely structural approaches to the study of radicalization are insufficient to 
explain the process: ‘It is erroneous to presume that material deprivation works 
in a simple and/or straightforward manner in relation to the propensity to 
commit violence’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 338). True, radicalization takes 
place when a considerable cultural and relational distance, along with severe 
forms of inequality and injustice, exist between the parties involved. But to claim 
that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of terrorism neglects the 
fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed by the United Nations 
as the poorest and least developed. As Sen (2015: 165) has argued,  
 
‘The simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too 
crude both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from 
universally observed, and because there are other social factors… Calcutta 
is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it 
so happens that it also has a very low crime rate’ (ibid: 165).  
 
   In failed democracies, the young immigrants do not join terrorist networks out 
of existential vacuum or mere marginalization, but from resentment born of the 
humiliation suffered by people to which they feel close. While their parents 
chose where to live and partly maintained the culture of their country of origin, 
the young distanced themselves from that culture without acquiring a new one: 
‘the danger that ruins life in the poor districts is not Islam or multiculturalism… 
it is deculturation’ (Todorov, 2014: 168). ‘Deculturation’ is one of the 
characteristics of failed democracies, which are based on a winner-take-all logic 
whereby the losers are left with no place to occupy. Becoming extremist, in this 
situation, amounts to ‘pure and simple regression that offers a mixture of 
sacrificial and criminal heroism’ (Badiou, 2016: 56). Failed democracies, while 
wreaking destruction, encourage revenge, which is formalized through the 
mythology of tradition, as it is often the case in liberation struggles. The parallel 
may be illuminating.  
   The history of anti-colonization gives several examples of how national 
struggles aim at liberating peoples from external oppressors as well as from the 
internal effects of that oppression. Traditional local elites in colonies were 
formed of individuals who mediated foreign rule, negotiated or accommodated 
demands, ‘making the best of a difficult and often humiliating relationship’ 
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(Walzer, 2015: 2). These elites offering liberation were likely to be regarded with 
suspicion, and forced to accept nationalist claims. 
 
Even Gandhi was deeply opposed to many aspects of Hindu culture, 
especially the fate of the untouchables. He was assassinated by someone 
committed to a more literal, or more traditional, or perhaps more 
radically nationalist version of Hinduism’ (ibid: 4).  
 
   Liberation entails forms of traditionalism, and the achievement of 
independence may witness the growth of anti-modernization sentiments as a 
weapon against the oppressor. While Fanon (1965) was celebrating the birth of 
the ‘new Algerian’, fundamentalism was already beginning its political 
counterrevolution. Religion was used by leaders as a tool for their immediate 
purpose: creating political unity in the anticolonial struggle, but resentment 
brewed among groups of people who disliked ‘those secularizing and 
modernizing elites, with their foreign ideas, their patronizing attitudes, and their 
big projects’ (Walzer, 2015: 26). Real liberators, in sum, were expected to set 
past and future glory against present humiliation, and to display their ‘alterity’ 
from the enemy in the form of the martyrdom they were prepared to endure. 
The struggle, therefore, was not simply inspired by the desire of independence, 
but also by the necessity to destroy the ancient enemy, the members of alien 
faiths, the infidels.  
   Terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are linked in this causal chain that 
exhibits feud-like elements of vengeance, each side answering random violence 
with random violence. Failed democracies create drastic ruptures and impose on 
their enemies a redefinition of themselves along with a radical reshaping of their 
strategy. This process is similar to that accompanying the criminalization of 
social movements, that leads in equal measure to some participants abandoning 
the fight and some choosing clandestine action. A scale shift is thus produced, 
whereby ascending violence is met with harsher exemplary punishments and 
spectacular retaliation. In response, violent groups launch yet higher levels of 
threats and deploy more spectacular violence (Tilly, 2004). 
    Failed democracies and the radicalized others activate their respective hidden 
networks and tools, the former choosing illegal forms of annihilation of the 
enemy, the latter mobilizing the fragmented groups and identities forced to a 
clandestine existence. Repression may push dissent underground, but may fail to 
destroy the informal networks and the social relationships through which  
identities are structured. Extreme repression, moreover, reduces the variety of 
points of reference for aggrieved groups, selecting the most extreme among 
them. This is when state agents can blend elements of warfare with those of  
criminal justice, thus responding to the radicalization they have created. 
Although at times radical violence may appear to be an unpredictable outburst 
or unexplainable explosion, it possesses a ‘geometrical precision’. It occurs when 
the social geometry of a conflict is violent. 
 
‘Every form of violence has its own structure, whether a beating 
structure, dueling structure, lynching structure, feuding structure, 
genocide structure – or terrorist structure. Structures kill and maim, not 
individuals or collectivities’ (Black, 2004: 15). 
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Review of Some Classical Literature  
 
Violent conflict has been an object of study in criminology since the very 
inception of the discipline. Before the word ‘terrorism’ gained common usage, 
early criminologists dealt with both institutional and anti-institutional violence. 
Classical criminology, particularly the work of Cesare Beccaria (1965) and 
Jeremy Bentham (1967), regarded political violence as a breach of the social 
contract binding citizens and authority together. The focus of Beccaria, however, 
was on ‘state savagery’ and, at the same time, on ‘crimes of sedition’. He linked 
institutional violence (torture, capital punishment, assassinations and other 
forms of state violence) with violent outbursts directed against the state. From a 
contemporary perspective, we can summarize his thought as follows: excessive 
state violence provokes violent responses by non-state agents (Beccaria, 1965).  
   Positivist criminologists studied regicides, romantic murderers and violent 
anarchists and looked at social and psychological causes of political violence. 
While in general they thought that violent action against the system retained an 
‘evolutive’ character, in the sense that it accelerated social change, when faced 
with specific forms of terrorist acts they judged those acts as the exploits of 
monomaniac individuals who would be violent even if not inspired by political 
beliefs. Their distinction between rebellion and revolution was, in this respect, 
crucial. The former, in their view, was conduct caused by insanity, moral 
madness, narcissistic martyrdom or suicidal drive.  The latter was seen as an 
evolutionary process which, without necessarily resorting to violence, aimed at 
producing social change and improved social justice. It is noteworthy that this 
school of thought formulated a notion of ‘suicide missions’ well before these 
became common currency in the present times, as they described anarchists who 
assassinated aristocrats in the middle of the streets as individuals whose 
principal aim was an ‘honourable death’ or ‘indirect suicide’ (Lombroso 1894; 
Lombroso and Laschi, 1890).  
   An excess of integration in a system of values was identified by Emile Durkheim 
as one of the causes leading to suicide. However, it is from his study of homicide 
that significant pointers can be gleaned for an analysis of political violence and 
terrorism. Durkheim associated the rise of homicide to the growth of those 
collective sentiments obsessively focused on social entities such as the group, the 
family, or the state. The feelings that lie at the base of the cult of such entities 
may be in themselves conducive to murder. When the family, the group, the 
state, or for that matter a political idea or a religious belief, appear to be the 
supreme good, their importance transcends the sympathy and compassion due 
to the individual or people in general. Like some forms of suicide, terrorism and 
political violence in general may be the result of excessive integration in a creed, 
an identity, or of a strong form of binding to a set of moral values (Durkheim, 
1996).  
    Subsequent criminological analysis focused on collective conflicts, describing 
societies composed of competing groups and contrasting value systems. Political 
violence, from the perspective of conflict theory, is interpreted as the outcome of 
struggles for the attainment of material and ideological power (Quinney, 1971, 
1977; Taylor, 1981; Turk, 1982; Vold et al, 1998).  
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   Finally, symbolic interactionism examined the relational dynamics that 
produce harmony or conflict, in other words, how interacting individuals and 
groups determine their mutual conduct. From this perspective, state and non-
state entities engage in acts of terror when both feel that they have no space left 
for peaceful interaction.  
   In the previous pages, aspects of these perspectives can de detected.  
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